SEOUL—“We think this will be our last winter of discontent,” muses a leading South Korean politician from the opposition Grand National Party (GNP). “When the flowers next bloom, however, we hope we can see American daisies, too.” South Koreans pick a new president next week, and the conservative GNP looks likely to take power, ending a decade of progressive rule by Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. The conservatives are riding a wave of voter anger over government scandals and President Roh’s enthusiastic outreach to North Korea. Should the GNP win the presidency, as is expected, the United States would have a chance to repair relations with one of its most important allies.

This election cycle has been anything but smooth. The GNP’s candidate, former Hyundai executive and Seoul mayor Lee Myung-bak, was only recently cleared of corruption charges. Lee is also being challenged from within his own party by its ex-leader, Lee Hoi-chang, who is running for president as an independent conservative. But the former mayor leads in all the polls and seems almost certain to win next week.

Ties between Washington and Seoul have cratered since Roh Moo-hyun came to power in 2003 on an anti-American platform. The worst effect has been on the unique military relationship between the two countries, which many observers believe has produced the best joint fighting force in the world. At the demand of Roh’s government, the Combined Forces Command structure, which gives a U.S. commander wartime operational control over South Korean and American troops, is scheduled to be abolished by 2012 and replaced by two separate combat commands. An overwhelming majority of South Korean officers oppose the dissolution, and one high-ranking officer recently told me that he felt “betrayed” by the United States when former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld agreed to the restructuring after decades of joint sacrifice.

Similarly, some political and military leaders here lament that the U.S.-Korea alliance has remained exclusively military-oriented. “We’re having troubles because we haven’t developed a true alliance, with a political and cultural component,” stated another senior officer. Many South Koreans regard the proposed U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement as vital, not only for continued economic growth, but for tying the two countries closer together. If Congress rejects the trade deal, some say it would be a disastrous blow to the bilateral relationship and further damage American credibility.

Many South Koreans regard the proposed U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement as vital, not only for continued economic growth, but for tying the two countries closer together.

South Korea’s conservative politicians and military officers are also worried about the recent softening of Bush administration policy on North Korea. They don’t trust Kim Jong Il and fear that Washington is now emboldening those elements inside South Korea that downplay the threat from Pyongyang. At the same time, though, South Korean politicians are aware that as their nation becomes more affluent its citizens may be less willing to do anything provocative against the North that might threaten their prosperity.

Regardless, Washington should capitalize on the upcoming change in the Blue House (South Korea’s official presidential residence), especially if Lee and the GNP win. At the top of the agenda should be the following three goals:

First, the United States should propose delaying the dissolution of the Combined Forces Command until 2020. This would give South Korea’s military time to boost its capabilities and would also calm jittery South Korean officers who fear a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces after 2008. As it is, Washington’s drawdown of U.S. troops to 25,000 is stoking concern over America’s long-term commitment to the peninsula.

Second, Washington should take the lead in quietly reconstituting trilateral activities among Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Senior-level South Korean officers are guardedly receptive to closer strategic links with the Japanese, seeing Tokyo as a possible bulwark against China’s growing strength—but America must be the broker. If Lee wins the presidency, a GNP government might be more willing to pursue constructive ties with Japan. For there to be any real warming in Japanese-Korean relations, however, Tokyo must address more openly the lingering historical issues that inflame Koreans, including wartime sex slavery and the control of a small island chain located between the two nations.

Third, the United States should reach out aggressively to broad sections of Korean society, particularly members of the younger, under-40 generation, who are said to be more anti-American than their parents. Many of these younger Koreans are well traveled and have visited the United States, and would likely be receptive to genuine American interest in Korea. For that matter, Congress should show a political commitment to the bilateral relationship by passing the U.S.-Korea FTA. In addition, intensified cultural and student exchanges, American appreciation for the sacrifices of South Korean troops who have served alongside U.S. forces around the world, and U.S. sensitivity to Korea’s successes in the face of adversity would go a long way toward reassuring a country that sees its geography as its destiny.

“We picked you as allies because we’re caught between giant elephants,” says one South Korean official, referring to his nation’s powerful neighbors. Faced with this unchangeable situation, and with a hostile dictatorship to their north, South Koreans are doggedly realistic about their choices. Washington should be just as realistic about the value of this key U.S. ally.

Michael Auslin is a resident scholar in Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute.