BEIJING—It is tempting, but too simplistic, to argue that Chinese foreign policy is the result of a struggle between the forces of moderation and liberalism on one side and the forces of nationalism and aggression on the other. China is too large and complex to be explained by such a simple dichotomy. Instead, there are many groups, interests, and voices in China trying to push and pull the Chinese Communist Party. There are enormously successful Chinese businessmen who hope for less government capriciousness; regime-linked think tank analysts schooled in Western international relations theory who speak reasonably in terms of common Sino-American interests and the dangers of miscalculation; independent scholars who demand economic and political liberty now; diehard nationalists who believe China is too soft on the United States, Japan, and most of all, Taiwan, and who want to reestablish Chinese dominance in Asia; destitute peasants seeking to survive amid painful economic change; activists angry about endemic corruption; and more. These voices, and their arguments, are accessible, provided foreigners seek them out. 

Much less accessible, however, is the thinking of those in the Chinese government and military who actually make key strategic decisions. And no one can say with confidence how much sway any outside group has over the Communist Party. That leaves Americans rightfully concerned about the future of Sino-American relations. The aspirations of forward-looking Chinese do not seem to influence China’s external conduct. Nor are Beijing’s official foreign policy pronouncements consistent with its behavior. 

Recent Chinese military activity has sown deep doubts about whether 'peace and development' is anything more than a reassuring slogan—one that China needs to promulgate while it is still too weak to change the status quo.

If economic growth and “peace and development” are China’s main goals—as the Communist Party states, and as many Chinese surely desire—then why is China engaged in the most significant military buildup in the world? The PRC enjoys a secure external environment: East Asia is more stable today than it has been in decades. Chinese protestations that the military buildup is “all about Taiwan” are less than reassuring. For one thing, the very idea that China would prepare for war with a de facto sovereign nation over which it has had no official control since the late 1800s is totally inconsistent with modern notions of sovereignty. There are many English-speaking countries that are no longer part of the British Empire; nor are all German-speaking countries part of Germany. Both England and Germany are doing just fine without their former colonies. And should China’s intentions change as its strength increases, the same military capabilities that could be used against Taiwan could also be deployed against American forces in a range of scenarios. 

China’s recent behavior has prompted legitimate questions about its motives. For example: if maintaining warm relations with the United States is China’s most important international priority, why did Beijing close the port of Hong Kong to an American ship on Thanksgiving? (This gratuitous decision left military families who had flown all the way from the United States to see their loved ones waiting in vane for the sailors to arrive.) Why has China abrogated maritime convention and denied safe harbor to American ships in distress? Why did it test a dangerous anti-satellite weapon? 

The missile test sowed deep doubts in Washington about whether “peace and development” is anything more than a reassuring slogan—one that China needs to promulgate while it is still too weak to change the status quo. Either Chinese officials do not understand the consequences of their actions or they simply do not care. If it’s the former, as many optimists believe, then we may have a chance to influence China’s direction. But if it’s the latter, our options are more constrained. 

If an American visitor to China discusses politics with, say, a group of Shanghai businessmen, he or she may leave the PRC feeling reassured and optimistic. During my recent trip to China, I walked away from talks with business leaders impressed by the entrepreneurial energy in the country. Meeting China’s economic and intellectual elite can leave one hopeful that, much like its neighbors in South Korea and Taiwan, China will eventually become a democracy, and that America and China will work together to solve common problems and strengthen the international system. 

Such predictions can be soothing—but only temporarily. It usually doesn’t take long before China issues a blustery threat to Taiwan, jails another pro-democracy activist, unveils a new attack submarine that poses a threat to the U.S. navy, or provides Iran with diplomatic cover as it continues pursuing its nuclear program. Perhaps the PRC intends to grow within the international system but simply does not like its mostly American-made rules. Maybe when China is strong enough it will establish new rules more to its liking. 

Doing so would not make sense to the American mind, nor would it make sense to the liberal, pro-Western Chinese with whom many American visitors interact. But as recent events have made clear, our influence over Chinese foreign policy remains limited, and the influence of our favorite Chinese democrats is even more limited. They are not calling the shots in Beijing—and we do not really know the people who are.

Dan Blumenthal is resident fellow in Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image by Getty Images/Darren Wamboldt.