Making the Most of our Faculties
Monday, January 22, 2007
Filed under: Public Square
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Are low wages for professors economically inefficient?
Nine times out of ten I happily tip my hat to Adam Smith and call it a day. But an examination of lifetime earnings for some of the top-educated professions gives reason to suppose that certain career incentives have long been askew. Consider the hypothetical case of two college roommates graduating near the top of their class in 2007. One chooses to enter law school while the other hears the ivory tower beckoning him to a career in academia. Both have similar experience and credentials, but the career paths they choose upon graduation will lead them to strikingly different financial outcomes. The services lawyers, doctors, and business leaders provide are excludable in a way that the services of academics are not. The case of his roommate Brian, the would-be academic, is somewhat different. Like most doctoral students, Brian receives a stipend that covers tuition and living expenses and therefore avoids the accumulation of heavy debt while in graduate school. But this comes at a huge opportunity cost. Mark will already be three years out of law school by the time Brian receives his Ph.D. in 2013. If Brian is lucky, he will secure a tenure-track position, earning somewhere in the neighborhood of half Mark's post-graduation salary. In the grand scheme of things, it is a fine income, but one that is surprisingly low in light of the fact that he will have doubled Mark's time-investment in graduate education. The salary will slowly increase over time, but even in the best of circumstances Brian and Mark will likely want to go to different restaurants when they meet on the night of their ten-year reunion.
In looking at these figures, it would be easy to assume that the income gap exists simply because the services that academics provide are in low demand relative to other highly-educated professions. But there are other market forces that may be at play. Another possible economic explanation derives from the fact that the services lawyers, doctors, and business leaders provide are excludable in a way that the services of academics are not. A doctor bills each and every patient for whom he performs a procedure. A lawyer bills his client for every hour spent at work. And a business executive's strategies are kept proprietary such that a competing company cannot siphon off benefit from the efforts of expertise for which it does not pay. In each case, the costs are born exclusively by the individuals who benefit from the service. There are no free riders. The social benefits of education are made less dramatic by the slow pace at which they percolate. It is generally accepted that, under a well-functioning free market, the best minds will go to where they are most needed because it is there that they will be most highly compensated. But perhaps academia provides an example of a market failure, where highly trained researchers do not receive full compensation for the goods they provide. How many potential Milton Friedmans, Stephen Hawkings, or Francis Cricks never published their papers because financial incentives steered them away from careers in research? Of course it is impossible to say, but I would hazard that the answer is, "at least a few." Add to this possibility the many social benefits that universities provide for which they may not be fully compensated. The positive effects of education include lower crime, lower rates of smoking, better health, higher voter turnout, and increased volunteerism. The social benefits of education are made less dramatic by the slow pace at which they percolate, but in many ways education is the silver bullet to address society’s most difficult problems. Because the social benefits are diffuse rather than specific to individuals, it is doubtful that universities are compensated for the full value they provide. As Sandy Baum, Professor of Economics at Even strong proponents of laissez-faire economics usually accept limited market corrections in cases where costs and benefits are not optimally distributed. Unsurprisingly, any plan to compensate academics for the full value of their ideas encounters huge practical difficulties. Many of these stem from the lack of a systematic way to determine the value and uniqueness of any piece of research. What individual would receive the benefit from a single breakthrough built on decades of others’ background work? Given that discoveries are not uncovered in distinct occurrences, but rather picked away at gradually, how could one determine when one idea is being implemented and not another? Would the incentive to pursue lines of research that are of definite practical value lead to the relegation of other research that, while more esoteric, is important in other ways? There are no easy answers to these questions. The popularized stereotype of professors as frumpily dressed old men with their heads in the clouds is no accident. It is a byproduct of the near-clerical dedication society requires academics to assume with regard to their work. As Burton G. Malkiel, the hugely influential economist and former chair of the Princeton Economics Department, has written, “It is a peculiarity of the academic world that a professor is not supposed to make money... it’s unacademic... teachers are supposed to be ‘dedicated,’ or so politicians and administrators often say—especially when trying to justify the low academic pay scales. Academics are supposed to be seekers of knowledge, not of financial reward.”
Perhaps, then, it is time to closely examine the priorities that the free market has tacitly established, not so much in the interest of fairness, but rather to encourage the activity we value most. After all–and I think Adam Smith would agree–you get what you pay for.
Timothy J. Ryan is a Research Assistant for the AEI-Brookings Election Reform Project. |
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