How does a democratically elected leader become a dictator? First he gets elected, then he behaves like a dictator.

This past Sunday, Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez “won” approval of a constitutional reform that will allow him to seek reelection indefinitely; he promptly declared himself a candidate for the 2012 elections and joked about serving until he is 95 years old. Not every Venezuelan is laughing.

Chávez’s diehard defenders are quick to note that the changes he has engineered to Venezuela’s imperfect democracy have been blessed in a series of 15 national elections or plebiscites since he took power in 1998. Indeed, having served as an accredited observer of the elections that brought Chávez to power, I can attest that he won the presidency handily by campaigning against the corrupt and unaccountable old order that neglected Venezuela’s poor majority.

But how Chávez won power is not the problem. How he has moved to hold on to power is. Lt. Col. Chávez’s march toward dictatorship began the moment, a decade ago, when he swore an oath to a constitution that he immediately pledged to destroy. In doing so, he became the progenitor of a string of neo-caudillos (strongmen) in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and elsewhere who win power through elections and abuse their popular mandate to dismantle their countries’ constitutional order. To the extent Chávez succeeds, Latin America may be dragged down the road of authoritarian populism and forfeit yet another decade to self-indulgent, dangerous leaders.

Sunday’s plebiscite is only the latest episode in Chávez’s bid for political immortality. Most international journalists will dutifully report that the irascible, anti-American leader has confounded his critics and turned out loyal throngs eager to keep their colorful leader in power. Very few will report that Chávez’s handpicked electoral council was ordered to produce this result or that he has abused the power and purse of the state to bully his opponents, muzzle the independent media, and buy the loyalty of millions of citizens who depend on his regime for jobs or handouts.

Very few international journalists will report that Chávez’s handpicked electoral council was ordered to produce the recent election result or that he has abused the power and purse of the state to bully his opponents, muzzle the independent media, and buy the loyalty of millions of citizens.

The casual observer or Chávez apologist will credit him for submitting his decisions to popular referenda. But his democratic opposition must counter Chávez’s state-financed campaigns after a decade of manipulation, violence, and authoritarianism that have virtually disintegrated Venezuela’s already weak democratic institutions. Riding high during a period of elevated oil prices, Chávez forged an intensely ideological, combative, and intolerant regime, brandishing polarizing rhetoric to incite class warfare and abusing the tools of the state to suppress and persecute his opponents.

Since taking office, Chávez has systematically concentrated power under his so-called Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República). One of his first acts upon taking office was drafting a new constitution that vitiated checks and balances and consolidated power in his hands.

Chávez’s allies in the National Assembly placed the courts and other public ministries in the hands of hard-core Chavistas and adopted measures to harass the media and other potential opponents. Chávez sealed absolute control of the National Assembly in the December 2005 elections; opposition parties boycotted the process and more than 75 percent of Venezuelans did not vote after an electoral council packed with Chávez loyalists refused to take steps to guarantee a free and fair process.

And most senior military and police officials have shed their professionalism and allowed themselves to be co-opted as partisan tools that Chávez wields arbitrarily against fellow citizens. It is fair to say that he has politicized the military and militarized politics—putting state instruments of coercion in the service of one man’s personal political project.

Chávez’s security forces routinely use indiscriminate, excessive force to put down political demonstrators, while virtually ignoring violence perpetrated by Chávez supporters. His opponents have been subjected to extended and unlawful detention and torture. Internationally respected human rights organizations have documented in dramatic detail cases in which Venezuelan security forces used excessive force or caused the death of innocent bystanders. A nationwide network of “Bolivarian Circles” (Círculos Bolivarianos) consisting of armed thugs routinely attack Chávez’s political opponents. Also, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has criticized the state for failing to prosecute hundreds of cases of extrajudicial killings and for not investigating “death squads” operating in the country.

One of Chávez’s first acts upon taking office was drafting a new constitution that vitiated checks and balances and consolidated power in his hands.

“Justice” is meted out swiftly against opponents of the regime, while a pattern of alleged abuses by government security forces goes unpunished, as Amnesty International has complained. Judges are chosen for their political loyalty, and impartial jurists have been gradually weeded out.

Using both legal measures and mob violence, Chávez’s regime has harassed and silenced media organizations and individual reporters to reduce the coverage of dissident views and to produce self-censorship. Most popular channels have virtually eliminated their opinion and news programming, and national reporters considered unfriendly to the regime have been hassled, detained, and accused of baseless offenses.

The destruction of the rule of law and the imposition of crony socialism has had sweeping consequences for the quality of life in Venezuela. Caracas has become the murder capital of the world, as Chávez’s police forces preoccupy themselves with hassling political foes. Venezuela’s state-run oil company has been packed with inexperienced political hacks; with production costs soaring and prices dropping, the once mighty company is in arrears to crucial contractors. Always dependent on imports for consumer goods, heavy-handed controls on capital and on the marketplace have caused shortages and even food lines. With oil prices falling dramatically in recent months, Chávez’s profligate spending on wasteful pet projects at home and abroad is burning up the nation’s hard currency reserves at a staggering and unsustainable rate.

There are some signs that these woes are eating in to Chávez’s popularity. In December 2007, he suffered a humiliating defeat of a previous sweeping constitutional “reform” initiative. He was forced by the military to accept the results but was permitted to conceal the extent of the loss. And, late last year, despite massive misuse of state resources to back his chosen candidates, the opposition won municipal and state elections in key regions (including the capital, Caracas) by margins too wide for Chávez to deny or defy—although official mobs have kept some opposition leaders from assuming office and their jurisdictions have been stripped of resources and power.

Chávez’s audacious decision to put his reelection referendum before the voters so soon after these recent electoral setbacks suggests that he knows that his popularity will continue to drop like a stone as oil prices fall and crime spirals out of control. During the recent campaign, Chávez’s reliance on naked threats and acts of violence to stir anxiety and fear among Venezuela’s voters indicates that he knew that he was in the fight of his political life and feared that his machine might fail him yet again.

Caracas has become the murder capital of the world, as Chávez’s police forces preoccupy themselves with hassling political foes.

Clearly, Chávez is determined to engineer his permanent reelection, and Venezuelans may soon reach a point of no return as Chávez realizes that he can no longer count on favorable results in rigged elections—in 2012 or ever again. Instead, he may resort to the capricious, dictatorial rule, the seeds of which he planted during the last decade.

Although the democratic opposition is often faulted for failing to rally a credible alternative to Lt. Col. Chávez, it is only fair to note that, abandoned by the international community and, in recent years, by the United States, they have been fighting an uphill battle against a shameless authoritarian ruler. Still, they have produced several honest and popular leaders (such as Caracas mayor Antonio Ledezma and Miranda state governor Henrique Capriles Radonski) who could give Chávez a fair fight. The problem is that Chávez does not fight fairly.

It is clear that the wily leader intends to hang on to power by any means necessary. The opposition must continue to formulate responsible, transparent, democratic alternatives to Chávez’s destructive agenda and deepen their ties with the growing number of Venezuelans who are unwilling to forfeit their future.

Roger F. Noriega, a senior State Department official from 2001 to 2005, is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and managing director of Vision Americas LLC, which represents foreign and domestic clients.

Image by Getty.